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JURIES AND JusncE. By Marcus Gleisser. Cranbury, N.J.: Barnes.
1968. Pp. 354. $6.
While the continued insistence of American lawyers on jury
trials in civil suits is probably sincere, according to author Gleisser
it is "born of the fear of changes needed by society and founded
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upon some vague thought of the miracle expected from a dozen wellmeaning but uninformed citizens selected at random from the
general community" (preface). Five years ago this reviewer told the
bar of New York State that what was needed in the endlessly ongoing
dispute about the worth of civil juries was "an objective nonemotional study of the question in all its aspects by competent bodies,
and then a thorough airing of the whole matter at the bar of
opinion.'' 1 The key word is "nonemotional"; of eloquence and emotion we have had enough. It is high time for the traditionalists to
stop quoting Blackstone, DeTocqueville, and Joseph Choate; and
it is also time for the modems to stop relying on Arthur Vanderbilt,
Dean Griswold, and David Peck. This book represents a welcome
new_ approach by _presenting observations by a highly competent
prize-winning big-city newspaperman with a law degree and years
of experience covering jury trials.
Basically, modem criticism of the civil jury system centers on two
points: first, a juryman called in from the street is not competent to
decide lawsuits; and second, the system wastes the time of everyone
concerned. The proponents of the civil jury system see the following
merits: tradition, participation by citizens in the administration of
justice, and less rigorous application of the strict letter of the law in
the interest of social justice. Let it be said for Mr. Gleisser that he
has directed his book at these competing positions, although his conclusions are of necessity based upon his own experiences as a journalist in the courts of a great city. These experiences mark out the
book's limitations, but fortunately it is not as simplistic as, for instance, Verdict, by Maurice J. Bloomstein, which was published
earlier this year.
·
The author begins with a description of the 1959 trial of a
personal injury suit brought by a man who had lost both his legs;
he won a 625,000 dollar jury verdict-the largest in the history
of Ohio courts-from the negligent railroad company. The plaintiff
had been a fifty-eight year old, 5,000-dollar-a-year employee whose injuries, so the jury-held, resulted from the bite of an insect flying out
of a vermin-infested pond which the defendant negligently allowed
to exist on its land near its right of way-an "unsafe place to work"
under the federal statute. The defense contended that there was no
proof of the cause of plaintiff's infection. The jury was the usual
mix of men and women, six of each, housewives and workers in
sundry occupations. The trial took nine days. Almost certainly, I
suggest, it would have taken only half that time without the jury.
The condition of the plaintiff was dreadful, hideous. The medical
testimony was voluminous, complicated, contradictory.
The enormous verdict for plaintiff was set aside .by Ohio's appellate courts, but the United States Supreme Court took jurisdic
l. 3G N.Y, ST. B.J. 104, 106 (1964).
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tion of an appeal. Before this last appeal could be heard, the plaintiff
and his principal lawyer both died. In 1963, four years after the trial
and many years after the insect bite, a 450,000 dollar settlement was
agreed on and the long dispute finally came to an end. In a subsequent commentary on the case, the Bulletin of the Cleveland Academy of Medicine suggested that the courts had not received .competent medical advice, that the verdict was "anachronistic," and that
it was a terrifying prospect in this enlightened age that jurors'
precedent-making decisions are based on "mysticism and fantasy."
Next, Juries and Justice provides a reprise of the frequently
repeated history of jury origins, much of which is not really history
at all-at least as it deals with the centuries before the fifteenth.
There are the usual references to Alexander Hamilton's opposition
to civil jury trials and his prediction that future years would
" 'render a different mode of determining questions of property
preferable in many cases in which [the jury] mode of trial prevails'"
(p. 43). Little did that youthful la'\'.ryer-philosopher foresee a future
year when the courts would be inundated by hundreds of thousands
of lawsuits dealing with questions not of "property" but of personal
injuries. Author Gleisser reminds us, too, of the decline and, practically speaking, the demise of civil juries in England, the country in
which they first came to full development. He comments sadly on
the eagerness of Americans "to hold on to the antiquities of British
justice and refuse to cast an eye on the modernization being conducted by their former teachers" (p. 48). He fails, however, to give
any attention to the apparently strong movement in England for the
return of civil juries. And his references to "juries" in other European countries are not very helpful, since civil juries of the AngloAmerican sort never really existed in the continental nations.
This is a book for laymen, but most of its readers will, I suspect,
be lawyers. In a way it· is anti jury, but the author tries to be objective, to describe the civil jury as it is. Not nearly as comprehensive
as the much reviewed Crisis in the Courts by Howard James (another
newspaperman turned court analyst), Juries and Justice is at least as
valuable a contribution to a layman's understanding of his courts as
its more famous predecessor, and perhaps it is better balanced. To
my eye, however, Crisis in the Courts overemphasized the defects of
American courts and devoted little attention to the remedies now
Leing attempted, with the result that the lay reader was probably left
with a feeling of frustration, if not bitterness.
Juries and Justice is at its best in its description of personal
injury practice as "big business." And it is correct in its statement
that many trial judges favor the use of juries in civil cases because
the judges do not relish the chancy and unsatisfying job of finding
•he fucts, cc;pcdally the ammmt of d~mages. Mr. Gleisser also pays a
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deserved tribute to the zeal of those lawyers specializing in personal
injury claims who educate themselves not only in medical terminology but in everything pertinent to trauma. A novel idea is presented in a quotation from Dr. Alvarez of the Mayo Clinic, who
solemnly asserts that the anxieties consequent to litigation may
themselves heighten the plaintiff's original pains and make him "a
very sick man" (p. 69). I would have thought that the injured person
would suffer more anxiety if he could not have the services of a
zealous, energetic attorney to present his claim to insurance adjustors or jurymen.
A more reasoned criticism of personal injury litigation is its
utter uncertainty and its delay. The answer to this problem-and
it will be accepted some day-lies in a system of scheduled compensation for all highway accident injuries, regardless of fault, in the
manner of workmen's compensation. The Gleisser book deals in a
telling and disturbing way with the uncertainties of verdicts and
decisions on appeal. Particularly effective is its discussion of the
difficulties inherent in putting price tags on "pain and suffering."
But the illustrations are, as always, carefully chosen and are probably exceptional. Usually, I think, if you accept the jury's findings
on the question of fault, you have to conclude that it does about as
well with damages as a judge would. To repeat, the better way would
be to standardize damages and abolish the vain effort to find when~
the fault lay for the accident.
At two places in this book Mr. Gleisser puts his finger on real
defects in our jury system. He shows up the anachronisms in our
formal rules of evidence and in the use of the grand jury. Both cf
these systems waste time and both are unnecessary for achieving
justice. Their continued existence merely proves how slow judges
and lawyers are to adapt to modern conditions, and how slow the
public is to reform an institution described to them in their high
school civics classes as basic and essential. Rules of evidence in civil
cases should be drastically overhauled. The grand jury should be
abolished, with the possible exception of continuing its traditional
£unction of investigating public officers and bodies.
In this reviewer'-s opinion the civil jury will add a few more years
or decades to the nine centuries of its history before the American
public discovers that it can get along very well without it. The
arguments against it--delay, expense, waste of everybody's time,
uncertainty of result-are persuasive. The British got rid of it for
precisely these reasons. They came to the conclusion that justice
must be prompt, sure, and uniform, results which, I submit, are not
likely to be produced by twelve nonprofessionals picked at random.
Charles S. Desmond,
Retired Chief Judge,
New York Court of Appeals

